Since the Governor General took his oath and kissed the bible before swearing in Edmund Barton, the first Prime Minister on Federation day in 1901, salient beliefs of political parties, their leaders and the public can attest to political decisions that manifest through immediacy of action for what is thought to be desirable for the moment. This paper explores the conditions surrounding the Prime ministerial power, of John Gorton, Gough Whitlam, Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke, Paul Keating, John Howard and Kevin Rudd to demonstrate how policy, promotion and personal traits have dually elevated Prime Minister’s status and led to their deposition. Political agenda, the ability to offer incentives to members of the party, such as promotion and principles of management are the most significant resources of provisional power a leader of the nation can employ to maintain contentment in the caucus and superior public polls – yet these indicators of success naturally fluctuate. Chifley famously admitted to his demise when he announced: “One of us has to take the knock; it may as well be me”. The Prime Minister’s personal beliefs are the only constant determining the rise and fall of their political leadership in Australia for over a century. Davis, (2011) alludes to this when he states:

Political leaders, to a large extent, are selected by circumstance. We hope great leaders with a compelling vision will be chosen on the merits of their attributes and the intelligence of their ideas. Yet good people are passed over because their skills are not those most in demand at the crucial moment, while poor leaders may be chosen because the times require a symbol (p. 29).

Here it is explained how the changeable nature of context can bring about destabalisation for a Prime Minister, despite cohesion in the House of Representatives, policies that are in the interests of the nation and a general sense of satisfaction shared among the party and public. Therefore, it is necessary to hone an ongoing comprehension of the dense social, political fabric that is considered ‘right’ for the times.

To begin, the circumstantial challenges and policies outlined to absolve these will be used to consider whether it ascended the Prime Ministers’ standing or attributed to their decline. In Gorton’s case, domestic policies were well-received by citizens against the backdrop of the war in Vietnam and Britain’s withdraw from south-east Asia. On the national front, Australia was coping with drought. The leader of the Liberal Party from 1968 – 1971 devised a strategy that aimed to halt the popularity of Labor Party in the 1969 election by introducing equivalent beneficial measures. He strengthened national identity by proposing to rid ‘God Save the Queen’ national anthem whilst assisting Aboriginal people, the aged and the disadvantaged. That said, other members of the Liberal party and state Premiers found fault in Gorton’s streaks of independent policy proposals, for example, soon after being elected, he proclaimed Australia would not increase their military presence in Vietnam, soon after; he pondered whether Australia should use nuclear weapons, rather than forward defense, delaying weapons inventory for three years. Eminence of international relations continued to be severely hampered when Gorton withdrew troops from Malaysia after affirming he’d defend the Malay Peninsula. To add, after outlining states could not devise any new taxation procedures without Federal approval, Gorton reactively tried to distract the Premiers from seeking Commonwealth funds by putting forward alterations to federalism (Oakes, 1973). These decisions isolated Gorton in many ways; policies were sometimes aimed at asserting his authority, ironically dismantling his very capacity for leadership. This appeared to be a good time for Whitlam to emerge from the woodwork with enchanting policies that enhanced the national community. 

The Whitlam policies on health, education, women, environment, Aboriginal affairs, the arts and culture, responded to the liberating cultural shift in the 1960s by serving to improve the position of citizens in an engaging way. Lucas (2013) reflects on the general public perception:

Whitlam represented something new and totally inspirational. This was not grubby partisan politics – the kind that brings cynicism and ennui and that, unfortunately, we still know so well. Rather, Gough (and back then we all seemed to refer to him on a first-name basis; he was part of the family) had an actual and exciting vision for how to live differently as Australians. And all of us ‘ordinary Australians’ knew this was about us and for us and that we all could be integrally involved. Whitlam’s ‘program’ for social and cultural change captured the collective imagination of a country (p. 178). 

Whilst these ambitious and effectual policies were steeped in novel legislative reforms, the fiscal consequences couldn’t be afforded. Inflation in 1973 was a major problem for Australia and Whitlam’s ‘crash or crash through’ response led to a referendum in early December to enact price control, claiming Australia was separated from the rest of the world as it did not have the power to regulate prices. Two questions were posed to amend Section 51 of the Constitution, defining the powers of federal parliament and were vaguely centered on price control and incomes. Whether prices included rent, interest rates, corporate dividends, salary, capital gains were not defined. Bob Hawke, then federal president of the labor party and Australian Council of Trade Unions would not have been overly excited about the reduced chances of wage rises presented by this agenda. Regardless, every state rejected the idea in a swish vote (Carroll, 2011). By mid October, 1975 the Senate indicated budget Bills would be passed if the House of Representatives could move for an election. By late October, Whitlam announced his party would continue in office should they discover means of operating despite existing funds being exhausted. On the afternoon of November 11th, 1975 Whitlam was invited into the Governor-General’s study, where Kerr issued him with a notice of dismissal through double-dissolution. Herein, moments after, when Fraser emerged from the same room, he had been sworn in as Prime Minister.(Sexton, cited in Bramston, 2013). The necessity of repairing the economic damage accounted for many of the Fraser government’s policies.

The Liberal Coalition swiftly shifted monetary policy; by 1976 gross domestic product increased over five per cent, personal income taxes increased by 225 per cent and money supply increased by just under half, although, Fraser was not without fault in terms of organizing these policies. Stone (2007) recounts:

In 1976 the Fraser ministry took 2098 decisions, of which 834 (nearly 40 per cent) were made ‘Without Submission’ – including some of great importance. Little or none of this frenzy was necessary, and most of it stemmed from the personality, impatience and personal dominance of Fraser himself (p. 13).

Arguably, Fraser could have been more methodical in his approach since many Australians by this stage were already of the opinion that Labor weren’t viable at this time, as shown by their sizable loss of seats after the Whitlam government. Also, public servants had already struggled to keep abreast with multiple oral presentations to the Cabinet with no documentation under the previous government and were due for a well-paced, considered approach in order to properly fulfill their advisory functions, alas; this was not often the case. Similarly, Fraser embraced multiculturalism however his scholarly approach was more discerning and cautious. Particular refrain from endorsing a strident national outlook was evident in his 1976 Australia Day speech, as this could give rise to ‘big government’ and extreme tendencies as was exemplified in the Second World War (Stone, 2007). Although philosophically well-meaning, the outlook failed to generate the same kind of national cohesion as the previous government. Nevertheless, his usurper, Hawke inherently embodied a world-view of ‘the brotherhood of man’ that modeled acceptance and equality.  

Many of Hawke’s policies were driven by consensus among the government and nation. Conveniently, a veritable transformation of the Australian economy also took place; one of the initial steps was the Accord policy. Shadow Treasurer Ralph Willis (cited in Ryan and Bramston, 2003) outlined:“it was to facilitate substantial and sustained economic and employment growth through significant reductions in unemployment, while preventing wage breakouts” (p. 141). The Hawke government had learnt from the disruptive cyclical economic patterns that occurred from the 1970s. Bob Hawke’s trade union dealings helped to create a cooperative relationship with government, improving discussions regarding wage indexation. Inflation fell by five per cent with no wage increases, while economic and employment growth prevailed. Deregulation and micro-economic reform and the decision to float the Australian dollar in 1983 provided greater access, increasing international trade and capital inflow. Finally, in Keynesian form, privatisation improved the balance of payments, despite challenging economic downturn. (Willis cited in Ryan and Bramston, 2003).In 1996, Hawke was trumped by Howard, who saw popular will as the source of his Prime ministerial influence.

Under Howard, the role became more innovative. Howard was fortunate to become leader at a time of economic prosperity and carried political management to an acme – through the rise of the 24-hour news cycle, integrating politics into policy and administration that surpassed his predecessors. (Kelly, cited in Cater, 2006).Contrastingly, Howard appealed to the neo-liberal, conservative Christian identity and managed to carve a stronger, more unified Australian value base. An astute, experienced and practical operator, he appropriated the egalitarian ideals on a domestic level, intrinsic in ‘the fair go’. Although his strong, dedicated approach to unpopular policies such as refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol which set out to reduce carbon emissions, supporting the United States on the war in Iraq and amending the Work Relations Act 1996 through ‘WorkChoices’, aimed at improving employment levels and national performance by removing the ‘no disadvantage test’, allowed some companies to dismiss employees more easily. It also required workers to bargain for their income and entitlements individually, without collective representation through the Industrial Relations Commission. Additionally, many did not approve of his reluctance to recognise the Indigenous society with a formal, public apology and the national history curriculum. Howard believed the Australian-centered history teaching program would strengthen national identity and create a common view, but most were of the opinion that it was too narrow-minded. For the Kevin 07’ campaign to take off successfully the way it did, Rudd only had to appear economically superior, ride in the previously well-managed resource boom and represent polar views on social and environmental policy. Many criticisms were raised regarding Howard’s lack of preparedness to leave the liberal party. Readying the party for its next leader, rather than foolishly forging on, may have positioned the Liberal Coalition for another undefeated election. However, as VanOnselen (2008) points out: 

By the time the Liberals realised their mistake and started focusing on the future, it was too late. Rudd had already claimed that ground with plans for ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, delivering an 'education revolution' and a 'fairer' industrial relations system, and improving the nation's productivity (p. 10).

Over the last 50 years, Prime ministerial policy has been placed somewhere on the spectrum of responding to, embracing and preparing for the times ahead. International conflict crowned Gorton’s administration of ineffective defensive and soothing political strategies, this placed Whitlam in a comfortable position to enact radical and progressive policies that acted as a catalyst for Fraser’s mode of recourse. From here, Hawke was equipped with personal and industrial relations support to carry out micro economic reform, to which Howard judiciously polished until his take-over by Rudd’s invigorated approach to fiscal policy, social and environmental changes by the Rudd government. These were inevitably more congruent with popular opinion. In terms of policy, all Prime Ministers have shaped their respective time in office for better or worse. Whether their actions were in the national interest or agreed upon by cabinet and public, all decisions were directed by the personal belief of the national leader. The Prime Ministers’ came to power since their choices were generally suitable for the time until their leadership was destabalised on consensus. Just as policy administration can be used as a tool to ensure a Prime Minister’s election or re-election, the ability to grant promotion to colleagues can sustain his or her leadership through the strategic selection of staff. 

There is nowhere on the planet like Australia where cohesion and discipline of political parties is paramount for caucus control, furthermore Australia is said to have the most regimented political parties in the world. Traditionally the factions and unions influence the Labor party, while greater reverence is assigned to the Liberal leader who personally symbolises the party (Jaensch, 2008). Australia stands alone in relying on collective government, needing policy coherence and political support. In Britain, political capacity ensures the implementation of cabinet government. The Canadian Prime Minister arranges the cabinet government (Weller, 2009). However that is not to say internal challenges, antagonism, exacerbated by scandals aren’t leverage mechanisms employed to destabilise Prime Ministers. Davis (2011) compares party collusion with cliques:

The Gang is a forgotten classic, yet it speaks with authority about how and why leaders prevail. Thrasher studied 1,313 gangs in Chicago and concluded that leaders matter less than conventional wisdom suggests – in gangs, as in political parties, leaders are chosen for a moment and then discarded. Leadership proves less a skill than a transitory play of luck… When structures are loose and membership voluntary, leadership becomes a bargain between leaders and followers, one always up for renegotiation (p. 4). 

There are historical cases where various incentives are offered to members of the party as a measure to convince government and public the leader is in fact ‘right’ for the times.

Gorton was fortunate enough to have people around him, reluctant to challenge his ideas. Circumstances allowed for his promotion to lead the Liberal party due to his distinguishing ability to convey his thoughts well in opposition to the popular Whitlam in Parliament (Oakes, 1973).Under Gorton’s control, Fraser was elected minister for Education and Science, as a reward for his support. To Fraser’s great disappointment, this also allowed Gorton effect action without the proper consultation of cabinet. Although the Prime Minister’s avoidance of using the appropriate organs of government concerned Fraser, much of his energy was concerned with education affairs and subsequently, Indigenous affairs in Wentworth, although he still kept watch of international affairs. Gorton’s unsupported military decisions regarding the Vietnam War threatened his accord with the party. By November 11th 1969, Gorton promoted Fraser to Minister of Defence to again acknowledge his supposed support. Later, he used this appointment to deflect his inadequacy and disguise Fraser’s potential by delegating the task of meeting with Colonel Salmon, Head of the US Army in Saigon headquarters for what he believed to be the task of protecting commanders on the front line. Meanwhile, correspondence and media reports suggested government intervention was being pulled back. To Fraser’s dismay, Gorton had ‘pranked the prefect’ in a classic case of school-gang survival-driven jealousy. In this situation, personal beliefs have influenced events considering individual sentiments regarding entitlement. This is indicated by Fraser’s statement: “There is within me, some part of the metaphysic and this life wasn’t meant to be easy”. (Compass: God in the Lodge 2014)

A similar type of tactical kerfuffle was repeated in the Hawke years, by the Prime Minister who attempted to assign undesirable duties to Graham Richardson, coincidently, also the then Minister of Defence, as a means of aligning himself with the ‘right’ people. Perhaps Hawke underestimated the extenuating effects of changeable, insincere promises as Richardson (1994) states:

“It was inevitable, anyway, that I would eventually join forces with Paul Keating. The tribal loyalty of two mates from New South Wales would one day overcome both our differences and Hawke's friendship with me. But had this personal relations disaster not occurred, the process might well have taken longer. No matter how unpopular Keating became over the next couple of years as the promised 'soft landing' turned hard and the recession officially arrived with all its misery and human cost, Keating now had an ally who could bring some numbers to his side” (p. 283).

Keating presented himself as an ambitious, talented, potential leader and Hawke had more alchemic work to perform if he wanted to stay in pole position. The treasurer believed he’d performed well as Treasurer, believing most of the government’s success was due to his tireless efforts.

“In 1988, over a year before the 1990 election, Hawke and Keating made a secret pact, before two witnesses, that Hawke would stand down during the next term to allow Keating an adequate period as Prime Minister to establish himself before the next election. In 1991 Hawke decided to renege on the deal, announcing that he would remain as Prime Minister for the next election, on the ground that he alone would be able to lead the Labor Party to another victory. Furious, Keating decided to call on a challenge” (Weller, 2004, p. 136).

Although Hawke believed in his own point of view and the merit of public affection to see him through, Richardson swooped in with a peace treaty of sorts, advocating for the importance of Keating’s continuation of membership in the party. A ballot was held in June, whereby Hawke managed to maintain his control of the Cabinet, however this triggered internal challenges. By December when the second challenge was mounted, Keating won by a small margin. In contrast, Howard’s heir apparent, treasurer, Peter Costello proved to embody more bear-like characteristics. As Bennister (2007) pointed out: 

This cabinet system looks more like a collegial system, one where ministers are involved and feel ownership of the process, though crucially are not permitted to develop a powerbase. Leaks are rare (although those that have occurred inevitably focused on the Howard–Costello relationship) and differences are played out behind closed doors (p. 336).

This is also a testament to Howard’s stable party management. For this Prime Minister, refusal to promote a new leader meant challenge came from the opposition who promoted themselves. Rudd saw the opportunity to commandeer leadership and mobilised through his performance in media circles, intentional presentation as a refreshing, progressive educational and Indigenous reformer contrasted the Liberal party’s weary efforts to maintain a stale image.  Ironically for Rudd, his concern for fame was the very principle that invoked party disloyalty – leading to his own party choreographing his replacement.

The ‘gang’ mentality is a common thread in the dissolution of Prime Ministers, Gorton, Fraser, Hawke, Keating, Howard and Rudd, but not Whitlam. However, their pertinent, self-encouraging attitude that prompts the leaders to endorse themselves, believing they are ‘right’ for the times despite surrounding evidence is applicable to all. Prime Ministers can also portray themselves in a fashion to ensure they are considered appropriate for the moment through making meaningful connections with their colleagues and the public. Davis (2011) confirmed this when he stated:

… Gang leaders cannot rule simply by domination of the strongest. There is a more subtle relationship between leaders and led. Loyalty is always provisional. Groups held together by one charismatic individual are susceptible to the charms of another. Leaders in turn seek to reinforce their hold by shaping the culture of their gang. They promote activities in which they excel and discourage those in which they lack skills. Leaders stress their wider contacts, their ability to negotiate for the gang with the wider world (p. 7).

This sheds light on the aspect of how Prime Ministers as leaders of political parties are constantly building the relationships with those around them. Their head status is founded through courage – daring to go where others fear, endorsement of others strengths and empowering them by presenting other members of the party with suitable tasks. Through evaluating the personal style of Prime Ministers from Gorton to Rudd it is demonstrated how these leaders are elevated to chief position and eventually defeated when the culture of the government and or public no longer wants to be represented by the qualities the Prime Minister personifies.

Firstly, when Gorton entered the position of Prime Minister, he had served for 19 years in the Senate, but had no experience with responsibilities of Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet. Positions with significant portfolios usually allows a potential leader to exhibit more rigorous skills and develop relations among colleagues in various arms of government, securing their role as a fine operator for the complex role and a figure of authority that others can have faith in that they will provide constructive direction for intricate agendas. About three weeks following Harold Holt’s disappearance in December 1967, Gorton was elected mostly with support from the backbenchers, however, except for the Treasurer, nobody in Holt’s cabinet supported him – some had even opposed him. Since Gorton had never taken interest in issues outside his ministerial domain or ever managed a significant portfolio, he came to the office mostly unprepared for the position. In the initial stages at parliament, Gorton would let Whitlam dominate, but he soon became to be a formidable opponent. Part of the reason ‘John the Bold’ was nominated leader of the Liberal Party was because many others believed he was the most suitable candidate to stand a chance against Whitlam. Gorton was sometimes partial to displaying his lack of regard for the established authority of Menzies who led the party for ten years during Gorton’s time with the Coalition (Bateman, 2004). Menzies recalls him as a ‘mischief maker’ and perhaps the members of Cabinet identified these qualities as something that they needed in those circumstances.

“Gorton also thought it was perfectly normal, and desirable, for backbenchers such as himself to question the necessity or wisdom of particular pieces of legislation. He would even raise objections when he was in full agreement with a particular proposal. It was not an approach calculated to appeal to Menzies or to the individual ministers who were under scrutiny”. (Hancock, cited in Bateman, 2004, p. 7)

This highlights that Gorton could head the party with a willful and strong demeanor and in the context of war, this was an appealing trait. He did not fulfill the expected supposition of an ambitious, vocation-oriented participant in politics. At university, his casual outlook led others to underestimate his potential. This is not to say Gorton was not invested in politics, in fact his strong aversion to communism and intentions to prevent its spread was a motivating factor for him to strive in the face of competition (Bateman, 2004). The public was drawn towards his lovable larrikin demeanour. These personal characteristics represented a large part of Gorton’s human capital that attributed to his rise to power. That said, although the highly disciplined party identified his attitude as essential for their success, Gorton’s inability to consult other members of Cabinet, often operating independently led to his downfall. As Reid (1971) claims:

“Gorton rejected the traditional system of cabinet government, regarded the premiers as mere irritants, antagonised the Democratic Labor Party, alienated the upper echelons of the Commonwealth Public Service, treated representations and complaints from employers' associations with casual disdain, did nothing to counter the mounting restiveness in the trade union movement, and discarded as wishful thinking the ALP's claims to be regarded as a potential alternative government” (p. 14).

This behaviour isolated Gorton and contributed towards his unpopularity. It has been said he often substituted careful planning for off-the-cuff reactions; furthermore his actions have been described as erratic and unpredictable. A signpost of Gorton’s incompetency for cooperation occurred on March 9th 1971. The House of Representatives met to discuss Fraser’s accusations regarding the manner in which the call out order of the Pacific Islands Regiment had been issued and authorised. Although the meeting ended inconclusively, by now, even Gorton’s supporters were dubious of the way he handled his affairs. The trigger for his undoing came quickly the next day when the Labor Party put before the House of Representatives a motion of no-confidence (Reid 1971). Gorton decided to run a secret ballot among the House of Representatives. 

Gorton proposed that the vote be taken in the party room. It was taken. The result was a 33/all tie. Gorton ruled that he had a casting vote as chairman. He cast it in favour of ‘no confidence’ thereby voting himself out of office in unique circumstances (p. 443).

Gorton’s time in office exhibits how demand for the person in command is changeable, but not without reason. In this case, the unexpected death of the party leader, a fascinating, vigorous opposition and Gorton’s opportunistic, dominating presence allowed for what has been described as an unusual and experimental phase of national leadership. To his credit, Gorton availed himself when he was considered favourable and gracefully ejected himself after the lack of confidence in him mounted to critical.

The finish to Whitlam’s Prime ministerial position was even blunter. In moving the motion of censure for Whitlam during the house sitting, Sir John Kerr’s words were:

The evasion and contempt of Parliament and of the Constitution have become a critical issue in the attempt of the Prime Minister to hang onto power. He believes that he alone is the Constitution; that he alone is the Parliament. The parliament is very clearly the Queen – in our case – the Governor General – the Senate and the House of Representatives. All have a proper part and proper powers under the Constitution. The Prime Minister cannot preempt their powers and their prerogatives (cited in Whitlam, 1979, p. 151).

In defense, Whitlam stated that it was the Opposition that sought to reduce the powers of the Senate. The Governor General has reported to have told Senator Jim McClelland previously in a private conversation that if the Commonwealth funds ran out that he intended to intervene. Right from the beginning, Whitlam’s ‘it’s time’ election campaign was targeted at much of middle Australia of which Whitlam thought needed convincing of progressive policies such as land rights, tariff reduction and the environment. Whitlam’s press secretary Evan Williams, cited in Bramston (2013) explained that Whitlam did not use many policy advisors, believing that was the preserve of the public service – defining himself as someone who would rather a greater sense of control. Williams was prompted by a Minister, early into his role, to swear an oath to the Queen and after sharing this with Whitlam, the Prime Minister said jokingly something to the effect that any oath of allegiance should be more properly sworn to him rather than her Majesty. This symbolised Whitlam’s emphasis on his personal sense of power. Among staff, Whitlam evoked a warm and amicable environment, creating nick-names for many in the Cabinet. Forming relationships of mutual benefit such as foreign affairs officer, Peter Wilenski, who had valuable talents of relating with ‘hostile public service heads’ and developed departmental structure to facilitate the transfer of power in the Public Service and reflect the policies of the new government. Aligning with Wilenski proved to be helpful in respect to Whitlam’s Fabian approach to policy implementation. Since his entrance into the Parliamentary system in 1952, rational, incremental reform was carried out. Whitlam also managed to please the media, in particular the younger generation of media liked Whitlam’s support for freedom of information, which for the most part, was founded in Australia by him. The notion of ‘open government’ was a well-received and timely after enduring for a long time a comparatively staunch and distanced Liberal government.  Williams, cited in Bramston (2013) suggests “Whitlam was the first to exploit the full potential of television, projecting gravitas and quick wit in equal measure” (p. 117). This kinship with the media very much helped his cause.

Contrastingly, Fraser has been criticised for showing a lack of interest in the press, claiming that they were predictable and superficial (Allsop, 2010). The intellectual, who came to power in challenging circumstances, did not have the luxury of building public support through campaigns and therefore internal communications are the focus in terms of the Prime Minister utilising human resources. Disputes within the parties regarding economic ideology created destabalisation. As McCaffrie (2012) stated:

“Within the Australian Liberal Party, Malcolm Fraser’s refusal to break with Keynesian orthodoxy frustrated the party’s ‘dries’, who believed in a pure form of economic liberalism” (p. 262).Coupled with the budget deficit, this provided leverage for the Hawke government to undermine the credibility of the Liberal monetary policy. Generally, Fraser believed in discipline and orthodoxy in regards to government management. Contrastingly, Hawke insisted on Cabinet solidarity.

Under the Hawke government, Cabinet ministers were compelled not to raise disagreements in caucus. Blewett, cited in Ryan and Bramston (2003) explains:

For if all Cabinet ministers and in practice all ministers, were bound to the majority view in Cabinet, then, given the numbers thus committed and the denial of leadership to any revolt, caucus was unlikely to prevail in any clash with Cabinet (p. 75).

The proposal for a Cabinet of 13 reduced inner-conflict and enhanced cohesion on issues. Ministers could operate with relative freedom and autonomy, creating empowerment among the party and with his mechanism for accordance in the Cabinet, Hawke could overview then concentrate on priority issues. The Trade Union ideologies were evident through the Prime Minister encouraging ministers to work closely with their relevant caucus committees and most established good relations, showcasing the efficacy of the government. Although the relationship between Keating and Hawke eventually dissolved, for over seven years, their partnership was an essential dynamic in the success of economic reform. Together they formed a supportive network with three other key economic ministers (Blewett, cited in Ryan and Bramston, 2003). Unlike Hawke, Keating’s office was dysfunctional. Perhaps this was due to his concentrated effort to hunt down Hewson in response to ‘Fightback!’ – the middle-income fiscal stimulus. Keating entered the Prime Minister position with a deflated sense of achievement. His less than pleased attitude at receiving the role with the state of affairs in disarray compared with earlier years had its effects on establishing a productive, cooperative mood within the party. Kelly (2009) illustrates this disappointment when he explains how when Keating moved into the lodge; “The house smelt of Hawke, his cigars and his complacency, the carpets stained from Bob-and-Hazel television dinners” (p. 33). When his friend Bill Kelty visited, Keating was sniffling with a cold blaming Hawke for staying in office for three years more than he’d have liked. This transcended into working life. Disorganised and unpunctual, Keating’s lack of spirit was lamented by Cabinet. Keating refused many important appointments, avoiding the structure of schedules – instead moving with his instinct and frame of mind. Adding to this, the media were working against him as he didn’t bestow many appearances (Kelly, 2009). 

Successful communication with the media is imperative in contemporary politics and Howard knew this. During his prime ministry, he gave more than one thousand radio interviews, four hundred television interviews and over one thousand press conferences (Tiernan, 2007). Howard was very industrious, by also expanding the capacity of the government, including nearly 450 staff, more than double Whitlam.

The Howard government was the first to make explicit its expectations about how staffers should behave, classifying Section 9, ‘Ministerial staff conduct’. Howard avails: “Ministers have closer day-to-day contact with and direction of the work of members of their staff … Ultimately however, Ministers cannot delegate to members of their personal staff their constitutional, legal or accountability responsibilities” (cited in Tiernan, 2007 p. 34).Howard’s relations within and outside government were professional, systematic and structured. This approach gave the public and his colleagues security in the fact he was reliable and constant.

If Howard broadened the political media landscape, Rudd exploited the 24-hour news cycle. The popularity in the dramatic and energised Kevin 07’ campaign in turn became his weakness. This was the first time in Australia Labor had dismissed their leader in his first term of office. McAllister, 2012 detailed. “Rudd also maintained a highly centralist leadership style, which focused on the micro management of all aspects of policy and eschewed regular consultation with key ministers. As soon as Labor’s prospects of winning the forthcoming election began to recede, many in the Labor caucus wanted to install someone with a more consensual leadership style” (p. 196). It was conceded that Rudd’s popularity was pivotal for leadership of the Labor party. The media was crucial for his career, yet the fickle nature of it would see demotion occur more rapidly than promotion for Kevin Rudd.

For these Australian leaders, governing style, interaction with staff and the national community, crowned by personal belief, to a large extent, determined both their appointment and dismissal. Shapable features of leadership including management of policy, promotion of staff and personal relations were crucial factors of governance for Gorton, Whitlam, Fraser, Hawke, Keating, Howard and Rudd. These aspects of the role were relatively controllable in many instances, though timing of events and context of situation is never constant, creating a colourful, cultural fabric of leadership in Australia.

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